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NOTE
Children in Pornography after Sharpe
Janine BENEDET*
In its recent decision in R. v. Sharpe, the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the
possession and making of child pornography, subject to two exceptions.
Despite a narrow construction of the definition of child pornography and
a broad reading of the statutory defences, the majority found thatprohib-
iting individuals from making and possessing some kinds of child pornog-
raphy was an unjustifiable limit on the freedom of expression guaranteed
by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The dissent
would have upheld the legislation in its entirety. This article argues that
the majority of the Court erred in considering the value of freedom of
expression in a detached and abstract manner. Operating in this abstract
plane led the Court to approve two significant exceptions on the basis of
hypothetical examples of overbreadth, without considering the reality of
the exceptions as they relate to documented child pornography cases. As
a result, the Court extended constitutional protection to some categories
of material that are clearly harmful to children. This result should make
us sceptical of the use in Charter cases of broad reading in remedies that
create complex judicial amendments with unexamined consequences.
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the Canadian Association of Law Teachers Annual Meeting,
Quebec City, Quebec, May 29, 2001.
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Dans son arr& recent, R. c. Sharpe, la majorit de la Cour supreme
du Canada a confirm la constitutionalit6 des dispositions du Code crimi-
nel qui interdisent la possession et la production de la pornographie juve-
nile, sujette a deux exceptions. En depit d'une interpretation itroite de la
definition de la pornographie juvenile et d'une lecture genireuse des
moyens de defense privus au Code, la majoritg a statue que prohiber aux
individus de produire et de possider certains types de pornographie juvi-
nile 9tait une atteinte injustifiable a la libert d'expression garantie par
l'art. 2(b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert~s. La dissidence
aurait confirm la legislation en sa totalite. Cet article soutient que la
majoritj de la Cour a erre en considirant la valeur de la libert6 d'expres-
sion d'unefagon isolie et abstraite. (Euvrant a ce niveau abstrait, la Cour
a approuvi deux exceptions significatives sur la base d'exemples de por-
tie excessive hypothitiques, sans considirer la rjalitg de ces exceptions
en les associant & des cas documents de pornographie juvenile. En con-
sequence, la Cour a itendu la protection constitutionnelle a des catdgo-
ries de materiel qui sont clairement nocives aux enfants. Ce r~sultat
devrait nous rendre sceptique quant a l'utilisation du remade de I'inter-
pritation large sous la Charte qui crie des amendementsjuridiques com-
plexes avec des consequences non-anticipdes.
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Children in Pornography after Shape
Using children to make pornography is a form of sexual abuse that
tends to produce an unusual degree of unanimity in the reactions of the
legislature, the public, and those who write and study about the criminal
law. Almost everyone believes that there can and should be legal restric-
tions on the manufacture of this material'. But even this consensus on child
pornography is partial and fragile, as evidenced by the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Canada in R. v. Sharpe2, in which the majority3 read a
couple of «exceptions>> into the prohibition on the possession of child
pornography in s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code4, based on the protection
for freedom of expression in s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms5. The dissent 6 would have upheld the legislation in its entirety.
The contrast in the approaches of the majority and the dissent in
Sharpe raises some important questions about the Court's use of the rea-
sonable hypothetical as a tool in Charter analysis; its approach to s. 1 evi-
dence in areas where social science evidence is extensive and inevitably
conflicting, and its understanding of sex equality rights more generally. It
also indicates that the contextual approach to Charter rights, and the rejec-
tion of a hierarchy of rights, has not yet firmly found favour with the Court.
This article argues that the majority and the dissent in Sharpe did not
merely strike the s. 1 balance differently ; they balanced different rights and
values. It concludes that, in considering this constitutional challenge, the
majority of the Court got lost in the realm of the hypothetical and the ab-
stract, in an area where justice demands a focus on the real. This led the
majority to add two exceptions to the definition of << child pornography >
based on hypothetical examples. This article examines the majority's re-
peated claim that « this [excluded] material poses little risk of harm to chil-
dren 7 « by attempting to answer two questions. First, what material will
fall within the exceptions, based on real examples of the making and use of
children in pornography ? Second, is it really true that such materialpose
little risk of harm ? The reality of the exceptions is that harmful material
1. That unanimity, of course, is entirely lacking in the case of pornography made using
<(adult > women, as if the crossing of an arbitrary line at 14, or 16 or 18 years of age,
signalling as it does the legal construct of ( consent >, transforms the pornography in-
dustry and its product from torture into art.
2. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45.
3. McLachlin C.J. (Iacobucci, Major, Binnie, LeBel and Arbour JJ. concurring).
4. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
6. L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ., writing jointly.
7. Supra, note 2 at 93. See also id., at 94, where the majority asserts that the material falling
within the exception ( may pose no more than a nominal risk >.
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that uses real children, especially adolescents, and that serves minimal ex-
pressive interests, is now protected under the Charter. The fact that these
consequences appear to have escaped the consideration of the majority
suggests that the broad reading-in remedy they adopted should not be
readily embraced in future decisions.
1 The Criminal Code provisions
1.1 The need for legislation
Section 163.1 was added to the Criminal Code in 1993. Subsection
163.1 (1) defines child pornography 8, while subsections 163.1(2) - (4) cre-
ate three hybrid offences of making, distributing and possessing child por-
nography9 . While it is true that the legislation was passed quickly, a point
relied on by its detractors, it was also true that there was widespread sup-
port at the time both in Parliament and among the electorate for legislation
that would specifically target child pornography, and that the question had
been on the legislative agenda in one form or another for at least the previ-
ous eight years 0 .
The legislation responded to a gap in the existing criminal law. While
the definition of obscenity in s. 163(8) of the Criminal Code was interpreted
in R. v. Butler to extend to explicit sexual activity involving children, the
Code does not criminalize possession of obscenity, only its manufacture
and sale 1. The obscenity provisions are inadequate to address the problem
8. It provides:
163.1 (1) In this section < child pornography >> means
(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was
made by electronic or mechanical means,
(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years
and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit sexual activity, or
(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of a
sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen years; or
(iii) any written material or visual representation that advocates or counsels sexual
activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under
this Act.
9. If prosecuted by indictment, making and distributing are punishable by a maximum pen-
alty of 10 years' imprisonment; the maximum term of imprisonment for possession is
five years.
10. B. BLUGERMAN, << The New Child Pornography Law: Difficulties of Bill C-128 >, (1993)
4 Media & Comm. L Rev. 17, 21-22.
11. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. Section 163 (8) of the Code provides: << For the purposes of thisAct,
any publication the dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or
of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and
violence, shall be deemed to be obscene. >> Manufacture, distribution and sale of obscen-
ity are prohibited by ss. 163 (1) (a) and (2) (a).
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of child pornography if it is also important to criminalize possession, either
because of distinct harms arising from possession alone, or for reasons of
enforcement. At times, the outmoded and limited offence of corrupting the
morals of a child was relied on instead, in an attempt to cover this gap 12.
The obscenity provisions are also inadequate in the scope of the activ-
ity involving children that they cover. Specifically, they require << explicit
sexual activity >> on the part of the child, according to the Butler definition1 3.
This definition does not easily cover all child pornography. For example,
the photographing of children who are naked and posed in a sexual manner
would likely not meet the definition of <<explicit sexual activity >>, unless
courts are prepared to recognize that the actions of the adult in getting the
child to undress and pose is itself a type of << activity >> 14. Nor does the defi-
nition of obscenity extend easily to « dress-down >> pornography, in which
young adult women are presented as children. This category of pornogra-
phy can include adult women presented as adolescents (in school or
cheerleading uniforms) or as children (wearing diapers or with their pubic
areas shaved 5.) The Butler decision does not define « child >>, or provide
any guidance for situations in which it is not possible to identify the exact
age of the young person used to make the pornography. While these ambi-
guities could presumably have been addressed in later decisions, it cannot
be argued that Butler made a child pornography law unnecessary.
The child pornography legislation was also timely because of changes
in technology. Technology is important because it affects not only the
medium through which pornography is made but also the amount produced,
12. See, e.g., R. v. E.(F.), (1981) 61 C.C.C. (2d) 287 (Ont. Co. Ct.), where charges were laid
after the accused took photographs of his eleven year old daughter posed nude or in
lingerie in imitation of the poses she had seen in pornographic magazines. Section 172 of
the Code provides: << Everyone who, in the home of a child, participates in adultery or
sexual immorality or indulges in habitual drunkenness or any other form of vice, and
thereby endangers the morals of the child or renders the home an unfit place for the child
to be in, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not ex-
ceeding two years. >> The provision, even if interpreted to apply to the making or posses-
sion of child pornography, is obviously limited to situations in which the child's home is
involved.
13. Supra, note 11, at 485.
14. This explains the presence of subsection 163.1 (a) (ii), which specifically includes the
depiction, << for a sexual purpose, of a sexual organ or the anal region. >> Indeed, the ma-
jority in Sharpe interpreted the phrase << explicit sexual activity in subs. 163.1 (a) (i) to
include only those activities toward the extreme end of the scale of sexual contact. See,
infra, note 23.
15. J.C. SMITH, Psychoanalytic Roots of Patriarchy: The Neurotic Foundations of Social
Order, New York, NYU Press, 1990, at p. 203.
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consumed, and replicated. In the case of adult pornography, the invention
of the home videocassette player in the early 1980s led to a substantial in-
crease in the amount of pornography produced and consumed by men in
North America 16. In the same way, the invention of the Internet has
changed and expanded the child pornography industry 17. Prior to the
Internet, child pornography had to be physically transported, by mail or in
person, from one user to the next. The Internet makes it easier to store and
transmit this material undetected. It also makes it easier to make child por-
nography. For a few hundred dollars, anyone can now own a digital cam-
era or a scanner and create child pornography anywhere, without involving
photo developers or even storing videocassettes or diskettes 8.
Not only is child pornography being circulated to more people, more
of it is being made and more children are being used to make it 19. Prior to
the Internet, it was often the same books and magazines, frequently pub-
lished in Europe or Asia, that were traded among users20 . This is no longer
true, and new material is made to order for Internet viewers using both local
and foreign children21.
1.2 Content of the legislation
Contrary to the complaints of those who seem to find the use of the
simplest words baffling when they are used in a statute that applies to « ex-
pression >>, section 163.1 of the Code defines < child pornography >> quite
16. For some observations on the increased incidence and prevalence of pornography in
Canada as of 1985, when VCR's were still fairly new, see CANADA, Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Ottawa, Canadian Government Pub-
lishing Centre, 1985 (chair: P. Fraser), at pp. 87-89.
17. Supra, note 2, at 154.
18. See the comments of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Jewell; R. v. Gramlick, (1995)
100 C.C.C. (3d) 270, at 277.
19. Supra, note 2, at 136.
20. For a discussion of the market in the late 1970s in the United States, see T.M.
BERANBAUM and others, o Child Pornography in the 1970s >>, in A. BURGESS (ed.), Child
Pornography and Sex Rings, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1984, at pp. 10-12. For
a discussion of the European and North American market in the 1970s and 1980s, see T.
TATE, « The Child Pornography Industry: International Trade in Child Sexual Abuse >>,
in C. ITZIN (ed.), Pornography: Women, Violence and Civil Liberties, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1992, at pp. 204-216.
21. R. v. Bauer, [1999] O.J. (Quicklaw) no. 5294 (C.J.) (teenage girl used in interactive live
show on Internet site; removed clothing and touched herself in response to electronic
requests from viewers).
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narrowly 22. The written material covered by the section is limited to mate-
rial that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a child that would be an
offence under the Code23. As for visual material -photos, drawings,
film- the section extends to material presenting a person who is or is de-
picted as being under the age of 18 and engaged in explicit sexual activity,
or where the dominant characteristic of the material is the depiction for a
sexual purpose of a sexual organ of a person under the age of 18. The defi-
nitions relating to visual material do not extend to mere nudity. The statute
is careful to define child pornography with reference to sexual context, not
merely anatomy, in contrast to some U.S. statutes24 . When these provisions
are further subjected to the strict construction placed on the section by the
majority in Sharpe25, and its broad definition of the artistic merit defence 26,
it is quite wrong to characterize the definition as sweeping in its scope.
2 The use and manufacture of child pornography
The statutory formulation of «<child pornography responds to the
reality of child pornography as it is produced and used in Canada today.
The counseling provisions address the NAMBLA newsletters, which try
to normalize sexual relations between men and boys with pseudo-scien-
tific arguments about the sexuality of children and how children benefit
from « intergenerational sex 27. The inclusion in the legislation of material
22. See e.g. A.W. MACKAY, <(R. v. Sharpe: Pornography, Privacy, Proportionality and the
Protection of Children >, (2000) 10 Educ. & LJ. 251, 296 (arguing that the section « casts
a broad net >); B. BLUGERMAN, 10c. cit., note 10, 26-31 (arguing that it is «<disturbing
that < the meaning of a number of key phrases [...] are by no means clear ).
23. There is considerable evidence that this kind of material is very important to many men
who sexually abuse children, and who create, catalogue and exchange extensive justifi-
cations for their behaviour. For examples of this behaviour, see R. v. W.A.M., [1988]
B.C.J. (Quicklaw) no. 2184 (S.C.) (45 volumes of personal diaries and extensive corre-
spondence justifying sexual contact with young girls), and also K.V. LANNING, c Collec-
tors , in T.M. BERENBAUM and others (eds.), op. cit., note 20, at pp. 83-90.
24. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1694 (1989).
.25. The majority finds that the phrase ( explicit sexual activity > as used in s. 163.1 (a) (i) is
limited to the ,< extreme end of the spectrum , meaning « depictions of sexual intercourse
and other non-trivial sexual acts. ) Supra, note 2, at 80-81.
26. The majority rejects the application of a community standards test and holds that the
artistic merit defence extends to «< any expression that may reasonably be viewed as
art >: id., at 87.
27. R. v. J.R.C., [1994] O.J. (Quicklaw) no. 3951 (Prov. Div.); R. v. Logan, [1996] B.C.J.
(Quicklaw) no. 352 (Prov. Ct.). NAMBLA is an acronym for North American Man-Boy
Love Association ; its publications advocate the benefits of sex between adult men and
boys.
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that present persons who appear to be under the age of 18 responds to what
can be an intractable problem of proof, especially where the children can-
not be traced, but also to the < dress-down pornography market in which
adolescent and young women are deliberately presented as children, often
with the clear intention of getting around child pornography laws 28 .
The ways in which children are used and presented in child pornogra-
phy more generally, whether produced commercially for sale or by < ama-
teurs for their own use or to trade with others, is quite similar to the ways
in which adult women are presented in pornography. The children used
range in age from infants to teenagers. The sexual acts include sexual
poses; display of genitals; fondling; penetration, including penetration
with objects and animals; urination ; bondage and other forms of violence.
Children may be recorded in sexual acts with adults or with each other.
Occasionally children are presented in obvious pain or distress, but more
often an attempt is made to present the child as a willing participant.
The motivation for making child pornography must be substantial,
since it is not often that people choose to make an evidentiary record of
themselves committing an offence 29. Even if the pornography itself were
not criminalized, participating in or counseling sexual activity by or with
children is a type of sexual assault. In some cases, the pornography pro-
vides the evidentiary foundation for sexual assault charges against the ac-
cused 30 . These men must find enjoyment or profit'in this material that
justifies that risk, regardless of the legal status of possession of the mate-
rial itself. There is no doubt that the market is lucrative; short videos can
sell for hundreds of dollars, although many users prefer to trade rather than
sell.3 ' For some users it appears that the psychological validation of trad-
28. R. v. Wise, [1990] O.J. (Quicklaw) no. 1416 (Dist. Ct.) (magazines presenting young
women and young teenage girls in child-like poses and contexts; including one <<very
young female person > in an act of self-mutilation with a curling iron). In Wise, decided
before the enactment of s. 163.1, and before Butler, the court found these magazines to
be obscene under s. 163 (8).
29. The existence of this record is at times almost taken for granted, as it was in the murder
trial in Ontario of Paul Bernardo. While the child pornography he made of his victims
was central to the trial, there was almost no discussion of why someone who otherwise
tried hard to avoid getting caught would make and store these tapes. At a minimum, the
opportunity to watch them again must have been worth the risk of detection.
30. See, e.g., Jewell; Gramlick, supra, note 18; R. v. WA.M., supra, note 23; R. v. R.W,
[2001] O.J. (Quicklaw) no. 2810 (S.C.J.).
31. T. TATE, 1cC. cit., note 20, at 208. U.S. postal inspectors estimated the value of the com-
mercial child pornography industry in the United States at the end of the 1980s as $2-3
billion dollars annually. A European distributor offered one investigator 200 hours of
tape for $10,000.
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ing material with others is sufficient to overcome the increased exposure
to detection, even without a financial motive32 .
Finally, it is also worth noting that the makers and users of child por-
nography in North America are almost all men, usually adults, usually
white, and often of middle-class means and employed. This is not a Code
provision that disproportionately affects the poor, aboriginal peoples or
young offenders. It targets those who know what the law prohibits and,
more importantly, who are very interested in what the law allows. In many
of the cases the accused show a considerable degree of interest in the line
between legal and illegal conduct and tailor their abuse to conform to what
they think the law permits 33. While none of these facts justifies
criminalization, it is another part of the reality that is worth keeping in mind
in evaluating the decision in Sharpe.
3 The values at stake
The reason that it is important to understand what child pornography
is, how it operates, what harms it causes, as well as who makes and who
uses it, relates directly to the constitutional challenge and how it is framed
by the majority and the dissent. This act of determining the nature of the
constitutional issue is referred to by the Court as identifying « the values at
stake in this appeal 34.
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing the majority reasons, begins by fo-
cusing on the value of freedom of expression in its classic abstract sense,
in terms that have found favour in American decisions interpreting the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. She refers to the Emersonian val-
ues of truth, democratic participation and individual self-fulfillment that
underlie the freedom of expression guarantee 35. She also notes that free-
32. Ibid., at 210.
33. R. v. V.P.S., [2001] B.C.J. (Quicklaw) no. 930 (S.C.) (accused told social worker that
photos of stepdaughter were not child pornography because « as defined, pornographic
laws are pictures or photos of genitalia > and her genitals were not shown); Gramlick;
Jewell, supra, note 18 (accused threw videotapes in river when s. 163.1 was passed, were
aware of higher penalties for child pornography as compared to obscenity offences). See
also R. v. Cohen, [1999] O.J. (Quicklaw) no. 4568 (S.C.J.), sentence appeal allowed (2001),
144 O.A.C. 340, where a police officer from the child pornography investigative unit tes-
tified that in approximately one-third of the cases in which he had been involved, the
offenders kept a file of media clippings on court cases dealing with child pornography.
34. Supra, note 2, at p. 70.
35. T.I. Emerson, « Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment , (1963) 72 Yale L.J.
877, 878-887.
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dom of expression is the matrix on which all other freedoms are founded,
and that it is not limited to only certain types of speech 36. She reminds us
that, << [i]f we do not like an idea or an image, we are free to argue against it
or simply turn away. ))37 Finally, Chief Justice McLachlin notes that free-
dom of expression can be limited if the countervailing value is sufficient -
and describes this countervailing value as, << the conviction that possession
of child pornography must be forbidden to prevent harm to children. 38
This statement of the values at stake may seem both uncontroversial
and appropriate. After all, the government conceded the s. 2 (b) infringe-
ment, which brought the analysis directly to s. 1, and s. 1 envisions a bal-
ancing of values. It would be easy to assume that the dissent simply
balanced the same values, but reached a different result as to their relative
weight. But this assumption would be incorrect, and it misses a more im-
portant point of departure between the majority and the dissent in Sharpe.
The dissenting reasons, written jointly by Justices L'Heureux-DubM,
Gonthier and Bastarache, set up the context for the s. 1 analysis in a very
different way. They begin by framing the issues in these terms:
In the context of this case, the twin considerations of social justice and equality
warrant society's active protection of its vulnerable members. [...] The constitu-
tional protection of a form of expression that undermines our fundamental values
must be carefully scrutinized 39.
They later note that:
The very existence of child pornography, as it is defined by s. 163.1 (1) of the Crimi-
nal Code, is inherently harmful to children and to society. This harm exists inde-
pendently of dissemination or any risk of dissemination and flows directly from
the existence of the pornographic representation. The harm of child pornography
is inherent because degrading, dehumanizing and objectifying depictions of chil-
dren, by their very existence, undermine the Charter rights of children and other
members of society. Child pornography eroticises the inferior social, economic,
and sexual status of children. It preys on existing inequalities 4° .
This language signals more than a difference in semantics. There is an
important distinction between placing limits on the extent to which con-
cerns about harm to others can restrict expression, as an endeavor with
intrinsic value (the majority's approach), and asking how much scope soci-
ety should allow for a practice that perpetuates the inequality of children
because that practice falls within the broadly-defined category of expres-
36. Supra, note 2, at 71, citing Cardozo J. in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
37. Id., at 70.
38. Id., at 73.
39. Id., at 120.
40. Id., at 132.
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sion- an attempt to convey meaning, in this case to oneself (the dissent's
approach). Of the two, it is the dissent whose analysis is rooted firmly in
the reality of child pornography.
The majority's hyper-abstraction acknowledges only in passing that
the only Emersonian value at issue here is individual self-fulfillment 41. The
majority fails to consider with any rigour why it is appropriate to place a
special value on act, here the use of child pornography, just because it is
fulfilling to the person who engages in it. If references to democratic par-
ticipation and truth are superfluous, as the majority does note later in its
reasons, why invoke them at all ?
The majority's reasons are similarly unclear on how freedom of ex-
pression as defined to include possession of child pornography forms part
of the « matrix > supporting other rights. Which rights ? Freedom of reli-
gion ? Freedom of association? It cannot seriously be claimed that pos-
sessing child pornography is the basis for these other rights. Instead the
majority is apparently making a more general point, namely that content-
neutrality is important to ensure that freedom of expression is truly allowed
to flourish, and it is this overall flourishing that supports other rights. Even
assuming that this is true, it is also largely irrelevant at the s. 1 stage, where
the Court has already recognized that legislative limits can be placed on
harmful expression and that harm can be measured in relation to the con-
tent of that expression, not merely its form or timing.
The idea that we can turn away from unpopular expression is simi-
larly disengaged from the context of the case. The children who are used to
make pornography cannot simply argue against it, or turn away. The sug-
gestion that turning away can be done < simply implies that opposition to
child pornography is merely a question of taste, and that some members of
society should not impose their view of this expression on others, so long
as they are not forced to look at it. But the objections to child pornography
have nothing to do with unwilling exposure or moral objections to what
other people enjoy. Once again, this abstract value is not helpful in setting
up the balance to be applied in the s. 1 analysis.
The majority does accept, in the rational connection analysis, that
there is a <« rational basis > for concluding that possession of child pornog-
raphy may create cognitive distortions that make the abuse of children
seem good and normal ; and that it may fuel fantasies that make pedophiles
more likely to offend42. They also accept that it assists police in uncovering
41. Id.,at 71.
42. Id., at 97-98.
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the actions of those who make and distribute child pornography. This is an
important practical truth for law enforcement, although the majority is
correct to be wary about using this as the sole justification for the rational
connection analysis. It is dangerous to rely on the fact that criminalization
of one activity makes the detection of related activities easier if the first
activity is not harmful in itself. Here it is unnecessary, in light of the evi-
dence of other harms. The majority also accepts that there is strong evi-
dence that pornography is used to groom children for sexual abuse and that
it harms the children who are used to make it4 3.
Nonetheless, the majority finds that the law is over broad, and goes on
to read in to the law two exceptions: written material or visual representa-
tions created and held by the accused alone, exclusively for personal use;
and visual recordings, created by or depicting the accused, that do not de-
pict unlawful sexual activity and are held by the accused exclusively for
private use44. To support this result, the Court relies on the fourth branch
of the Oakes analysis, finding that in these two cases, the effects of the law
on freedom of expression are not proportionate to the objective of protect-
ing children.
The dissenting reasons, by contrast, accurately recognize both the
minimal extent of the free expression value at issue and the real harms of
child pornography. The harms include not only those general harms rou-
tinely offered by the experts and noted by the majority: that child pornog-
raphy fuels sexual abuse or is used to groom children for sexual abuse or
that it is sexual abuse in its making-all of which is true-but that being
made into pornography or being sexually abused with it causes children
physical pain and risks to their physical health; interferes with healthy
emotional development; makes them feel worthless and afraid, especially
if the material is still circulating and being used; and impedes their own
self-fulfillment as children and later as adults.
Most importantly, the dissent recognizes that there are equality inter-
ests at stake for children in this case. The Court has repeatedly stated that
the Charter should not be used by more powerful groups to defeat mea-
sures designed to protect those who have been systemically disadvan-
taged45. Child pornography engages the equality rights of children in the
most direct way possible. Children are vulnerable to sexual abuse not
merely because of their age but also because of social constructions of
43. Id., at 99-100.
44. Id., at 103.
45. Id., at 120.
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sexuality that contribute to their abuse. The eroticization of dominance and
submission, the validation of male sexual entitlement, the idea that the in-
fliction of pain should be arousing for the person inflicting it and is wanted
and deserved by the person on whom the pain is inflicted all contribute to
a sexual culture that permits the widespread sexual abuse of children. It
would be misleading to label this behaviour < deviant when it is inflicted
on anywhere between 10 and 25 % of children in Canada 46, at least not if
the label of deviance is supposed to connote rarity as well as harmfulness.
Until fairly recently, there was no effective social support or legal redress
for children victimized in this way.
Sexual abuse harms children in many ways. The abuse itself causes
distress and physical pain. The lasting trauma can cause developmental
delays, problems forming relationships with others, anger and anti-social
behaviour, low self-esteem, and fear, among other harms. Where a record
is made of the abuse, these harms are increased, because this record can be
used to revisit the abuse. Even if the record is possessed only by the abuser,
and not sold or traded, the victim knows that her abuser can use the record
of her abuse for sexual fulfillment whenever he wants. These injuries are
the concrete results of exploiting children's disadvantage. They are inju-
ries of inequality, and the legislature has a right, if not a duty, to address
them.With this definition of the « values at stake , the dissent engages in a
balancing of two rights rather than setting up the analysis as one of a cher-
ished right and a state limit on it. The dissent balances a modest expression
interest against a number of concrete harms to children's equality rights, as
well as their rights to security of the person. The individual interests
achieved through « expression are engaged in a social context that also
involves the interests of those to whom the meaning is conveyed or, pre-
sumably, of those who are used to create the expression. The expressive
interest is modest both because individual self-fulfillment at the expense of
the rights of others is the interest engaged, and because possession without
an attempt to communicate is arguably not even within the ambit of s.
2(b)4 7 .
It might also might also have been worth re-examining the argument
that if the child sexual abuse recorded in pornography is an act of violence,
46. Id., at 137-138.
47. It is unfortunate that the Crown did not argue this issue. As the dissent points out, the
question of whether s. 2 (b) protects both the right to possess material that allows us to
understand the thoughts of others and the right to possess material that allows us to
understand our own thoughts, was worth exploring, if only to further clarify the weak
nature of the expression interest for the s. I analysis.
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then the act of its recording, in all or some circumstances, is also violence
and therefore excluded from s. 2(b) altogether4 8. Although this speaks to
the making of child pornography, and not its possession, it does point out
some of the absurdity of the Court's very broad approach to s. 2(b). At
what point does violence become expression ? When it is recorded ? When
the recording is sold to someone else ? When the purchaser of that record-
ing uses it for sexual gratification ?
The dissent looks at a number of contextual factors that provide a re-
alistic basis for assessing whether the infringement on expression can be
justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1. Unlike the majority's minimal in-
terrogation and acceptance of the social science evidence as meeting the
« reasonable basis threshold, the dissent considers in detail the number
of children sexually abused, the concrete harms this causes children, and
the societal harm that ensues when attitudes that promote the degradation
and dehumanization of children are encouraged. The dissent also points to
common law, statutory provisions and international obligations that indi-
cate a concern for the well being of children.
The dissent also spends some time considering the contextual factors
that affect the expressive interest. Child pornography is contrary to the
promotion of truth and subverts the equal treatment of children as mem-
bers of a democratic, egalitarian community. In fa ct, one might conclude
that the exclusion of children from participation in the democratic process
should make it easier to justify restrictions on expression that infringes
their rights, since they have no independent, effective means of reply. Chil-
dren must rely on adults to speak for them. Finally, the self-fulfillment in-
terest is purely physical and achieved at the expense of children's
self-fulfillment. A characterization of the interests at stake that is based in
the reality of child pornography and the inequality of children, not to men-
tion the concrete nature of the «<expressive> interest, is a better frame-
work for evaluating the legislative response.
4 The use of the hypothetical case
4.1 The reasonable hypothetical
The way that this exercise in value framing influences the outcome of
the case carries over to the treatment by the Court of the hypothetical
48. The argument that racist hate propaganda was violence and therefore not expression
was rejected in R. v. Keegstra, ( 1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 730-733. Child pornography, where
it is the evidentiary record of an act of violence, is closer to expression that is violent in
its form.
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examples before it. The majority relies on a few hypothetical cases to carve
out two exceptions to the child pornography law: written works that are
created by the person in possession of them- such as diaries, stories and
drawings -and visual works made by or depicting the maker that depict
only lawful sexual activity. The majority points to some hypothetical cases
that would support each example, focusing in particular on adolescents
who keep a journal of their sexual experiences or who take sexual photos
of each other as part of a consensual relationship.
Recently, the Court has been criticized for diluting the use of the hy-
pothetical case in its s. 12 jurisprudence on the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment.49 In R. v. Smith, the first Supreme Court decision to
define the scope of s. 12, the Court relied on the hypothetical case of the
young traveler crossing the border with a single marijuana joint in his
pocket to strike down the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years
imprisonment for importing a narcotic50 . The Court allowed Smith to rely
on this example despite the fact that he had imported half a pound of co-
caine and received an eight-year sentence. However, in more recent cases,
the Court has narrowed the availability of the hypothetical case to chal-
lenge mandatory minimum sentences under s. 12 of the Charter. In R. v.
Goltz, the Court held that the hypothetical had to be a «< reasonable >> one,
rather than a <remote or extreme example >51. More recently, in R. v.
Morrissey, the Court went so far as to say that examples from actual cases
should not automatically be used as reasonable hypotheticals unless the
facts are <« common examples of the crime. >52
The majority of the Court in Sharpe does not appear to apply these
same limitations to the use of the hypothetical case in its s. 1 analysis. This
generous approach to the use of hypothetical speech limitations has an
established history in the United States, where it is justified on the theory
of the <chilling effect>: that not only may a vague provision deter valu-
able expression caught by its ambit, but it may also chill some valuable
expression that is not caught by the legislation, because potential << speak-
ers worry that it might be. This justifies a facial attack on the legislation
even where the particular expression at issue in the case would not. This is
49. K. Roach, (<Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Searching for Smith ,>, paper presented
at the Colloquium on Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, Osgoode Hall Law School,
March 9, 2001, forthcoming in Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
50. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
51. [199113 S.CR. 485, 512.
52. [20001 2 S.C.R. 90.
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permissible because the expression that is << chilled >> will never come be-
fore the courts 53.
Hypothetical cases may also be used to show that the law is over
broad, in that it extends to conduct that is not related to the purpose of the
statute and not harmful, although the American cases have placed some
limits on the application of hypotheticals for this purpose, since presum-
ably those over broad applications of the law could come before the
courts54 . In Sharpe, reasonable hypotheticals form the basis of the two
exceptions that the majority reads in to the statute under the final branch
of the proportionality test. This raises two concerns.
First, the Court assumes that its hypotheticals are appropriate, repre-
sentative and non-discriminatory, without any real consideration of
whether that is true or how that should be determined. This failure to inter-
rogate which hypothetical cases count prompts a criticism similar to that
leveled at the unquestioning application of the « reasonableness >> standard
in criminal defences: how does the court know that its chosen hypotheti-
cal is not based on discriminatory or mistaken assumptions 55 ? R. v.
Seaboyer provides an example of this sort of sexual stereotyping in the
name of reasonable examples 56. The dissenting reasons in that case aptly
pointed out the tendency of writers on the topic to invent all sorts of
colourful examples of situations in which it would be unfair to exclude
sexual history evidence, many of which were based on stereotypes about
women that the law itself was designed to address 57. The assessment of
reasonableness, then, is not value-neutral and needs to be approached with
overt caution on the part of the Court.
The use of imaginary cases ignores the reality of the problem, rooted
in the social inequality of children, that the law was designed to address.
The people who are being arrested for possession of child pornography
often have multiple items in their collections. They know that this material
is illegal. Often the purpose of the multiplicity of files is to trade with oth-
ers. These individuals are aroused by the sexual exploitation of children.
They masturbate to this material and use it to try and get children to do
53. See G. Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law, 5th ed., Westbury, NY, Foun-
dation Press, 1992, at 862-870.
54. Ibid.
55. See, e.g., T. Quigley, <<Battered Women and the Defence of Provocation >, (1991) 55
Sask. L Rev. 223; M. SHAFFER, <R. v. Lavallee: A Review Essay >>, (1990) 22 Ottawa
L Rev. 607.
56. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577
57. Id., at 683-684.
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what is in the pictures or to make more pictures. This is the reality. When
we focus on the possibility of adults photographed in suggestive child-like
Halloween costumes or beloved uncles who die leaving a legacy of draw-
ings of naked children, to use two examples offered by others who have
written or commented on this topic,58 we become entirely detached from
what this offence is really about.
That does not mean that examples of other conduct that might be cov-
ered by the provision are inappropriate. But those examples should be
grounded in reality, not fantasy. To that end, the Court in Morrisey went
too far in refusing to look at other cases, even if their facts seem fantastic.
After all, those were real situations that resulted in convictions under the
provision challenged. But the Court in Sharpe should similarly have fo-
cused on reality in its consideration of whether the definition of child por-
nography is over broad. While the situations considered need not come
from actual cases, they should at least be proven to exist and they should
be critically scrutinized for their real implications. There is something cal-
lous about operating in the realm of the abstract while others must live the
reality.
4.2 The reality of the exceptions
The hypotheticals used by the majority to strike down portions of the
provisions do not have a grounding in reality. Instead, they fall right in with
the majority's abstract values approach to defining the contours of the
appeal. They are ludicrous examples that are used to chop out substantial
exceptions that cover a lot of real, harmful conduct. This is evident if one
focuses on the real applications of what the majority terms the « two pe-
ripheral applications of the law now exempted from it.
The first exception is self-created, privately held expressive material
that is a work of the imagination. This of course extends both to possessing
and to making this kind of child pornography, although not to distribution,
since the material is then no longer privately held. This exception is sup-
posed to extend to private diaries and drawings and stories, which, it is
assumed, cannot involve real children. This material is constitutionally pro-
tected no matter how violent or racist or otherwise harmful the stories.
With this exception, the Court appears to have in mind the situation of the
58. Law professor Jamie Cameron provided the first example in a television interview with
The National's Alison Smith at the time the appeal was argued, while defence lawyer
Edward Greenspan provided the latter example in: <What, Exactly, is Child Porn ? >,
The National Post, January 29, 2001, A14.
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solitary man referred to in U.S. obscenity cases who writes a document in
the attic, publishes it in his basement and reads it in his living room59.
But the Court is simply wrong to assume that written child pornogra-
phy never involves real children. It is often important to the person making
the written pornography that it be based on a real person. For example, in
R. v. R.W.60 , the trial judge described the home environment of the
accused's three children as one where < their father was frequently if not
almost constantly viewing pornography on videotape and though the
Internet, and where drugs alcohol and cigarettes were made available to
these children and their friends . The accused repeatedly sexually as-
saulted both of his daughters, for example by refusing to let them leave the
apartment unless he could first touch their breasts. The police also found
in the accused's home approximately 100 pornographic photos and a 36
page story in two parts entitled < Making my Daughter Mine > and < Ev-
eryone Else's Play Toy which describes his children by name and age
and which contained < a fictional account of how M. [one daughter] is made
a sex slave ... set out in excruciating and horrifying detail. The details in-
clude incidents of rape, torture, forced sex with animals, prolonged periods
of bondage, intercourse, non-consensual intercourse and fellatio with
friends of the father as well as friends of the daughter, and the intended
involvement of other friends of the daughter .
The accused was convicted of possession of child pornography with
intent to distribute because the story was written in such a way that it ap-
peared to be intended for an Internet audience. But even without that in-
tent, can it really be said that no child was « exploited or abused in the
production of this material, especially M, who lives with the offender in
the home where this material is made and kept? Is this what the majority
has in mind when it refers to material <« that deeply implicate the freedoms
guaranteed under s. 2(b) 61 ? This exception ignores the fact that this is
dangerous material and that the private sanctuary of the home is the most
common location for abuse of women and children. M has a right to live in
a home that does not contain positive presentations of her sexual abuse at
the hands of her father, particularly as she is being forced to endure that
abuse in real life. She also has a right not to worry that this story will be
shown to others or that the acts described in it are what her father is plan-
ning for her and her friends next week or next month.62 We do not auto-
matically allow people to make, use and store other kinds of dangerous
59. The first use of this example appears to be in U.S. v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91
S.Ct. 1400, 1417, Black J. dissenting.
60. Supra, note 30.
61. Supra, note 2, at 106.
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items in their homes until they use them to do harm outside the home. In-
stead, we allow laws that ban possession of these items outright.
Even more troubling is the reality of the second exception, privately
created visual recordings of lawful sexual activity made by or depicting the
person in possession and intended only for personal use. This exception
also applies to both production and possession. This exception does not
even require that the material depict the person in possession of it. Here,
the Court's examples focus almost exclusively on adolescents who record
their sexual acts as part of their sexual development in a mutual, consen-
sual relationship. No evidence is discussed that might indicate if this ever
happens, and, if so, under what conditions.
In fact, those adolescents whose « lawful sexual activity is recorded
often do not consent to that recording, are unaware of the recording63, or
consent to its recording under circumstances of deception or bribery64.
While the majority adds to its exception the condition that all parties must
consent to the creation of the record, the Crown will now have to prove
non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt. This will be extremely difficult
where the children in the photo or tape cannot be traced and where they
have been forced to smile.
The exception leaves unresolved the status of situations where the
consent is exacted through the provision of gifts, alcohol or drugs, or by
grooming an adolescent with other pornography. The majority does not
consider whether these situations would amount to consent in law. In gen-
eral, the provision of inducements and coaching does not make sexual con-
tact between an adult and an adolescent non-consensual for the purposes
of criminal sexual assault law unless there is also a relationship of author-
ity or dependency, for example a teacher and student 65. As for alcohol and
62. See also WA.M., supra, note 23, where the police seized 45 volumes of diaries dealing
with the accused's fascination with young girls, identified by name, many of whom he
sexually assaulted, over a sixteen-year period.
63. For example, in R. v. Lee, [1998] N.W.T.J. (Quicklaw) no. 137 (S.C.), the accused, who
was over sixty years of age, had sexual intercourse with a number of teenage girls and
filmed them without their knowledge. He gave the girls money to support their drug
habits in exchange for sex. In R. v. D.S.M., [2001] B.C.J. (Quicklaw) no. 1913 (S.C.), the
accused filmed with a hidden video camera his teenage stepdaughter changing her clothes
after a shower.
64. In Jewell; Gramlick, supra, note 18, Jewell's victims were unaware that they were being
filmed, while Gramlick's were induced with gifts and trips to be filmed in sexual acts.
65. Criminal Code, s. 153 (1). In Lee, supra, note 63, the court declined to find Lee guilty of
sexual assault in those cases where the girls were over the age of 14, or he honestly be-
lieved them to be over 14, because they had consented. Note that the provision of money
for drugs did not, according to the trial judge, vitiate that consent.
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drugs, the criminal law tends to require a very high level of intoxication to
vitiate the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse 66 . This would suggest
that in these kinds of circumstances, where the sexual activity is filmed,
the man making the pornography could invoke the second of the Sharpe
exceptions.
In other circumstances, more elaborate deception may be used to pro-
cure the recording. In R. v. M.E.,67 the accused committed sexual assaults
on his stepdaughter about once a week over a four-year period, beginning
when she was twelve years old. During this time, the stepfather purported
to introduce his stepdaughter to a teenage boy named Dave through the
Internet. The stepdaughter believed that she was in love with Dave and was
afraid of losing him. Dave began to ask her for nude photos of herself,
which she supplied to him through her stepfather. Some were taken by the
stepfather and some she took herself. Of course, «<Dave > was a fiction
created by the stepfather; it was he who corresponded with the stepdaugh-
ter, and who asked for and received the photos.
One can assume that this is not the sort of healthy adolescent sexual
exploration on which the majority focuses almost exclusively in creating
this exception. It is therefore not clear whether the stepdaughter, who
would have been about 15 or 16 at the time the photos were taken, « con-
sented to the creation of the record > . She might be able to characterize her
stepfather's actions as a kind-of fraud as to identity vitiating consent 68, but
this places an additional burden on the Crown in order to preserve an ex-
ception that does not appear to correspond with reality. Where is the real
evidence of adolescents recording their sexual activity to deepen their rela-
tionships with one another, without deception, coercion or bribes, and with-
out the involvement of middle-aged men ? .
The exception also creates practical problems for sexual assault cases
in which pornography is made as a weapon against the victim. For example,
in one Ontario case, a 15-year-old girl was sexually assaulted by her
mother's boyfriend. He took photos during the sexual assault and threat-
66. See R. v. Jensen, (1996) 106 C.C.C. (3d) 430 (Ont. C.A.). Recently, a Winnipeg man con-
victed of making child pornography after taking nude photographs of girls aged 13 to 17
whom he had supplied with a home brew described as <(liquid cocaine> considered ap-
pealing his conviction based on the Sharpe exception for '< consent >, but then changed
his mind, apparently based on the trial judge's finding that these girls were too intoxi-
cated to validly consent. M. Mclntyre, o<Nude-photo Maven Drops Legal Fight:
Shutterbug Won't Appeal Child Porn Sentence >, Winnipeg Free Press, May 12, 2001,
A5.
67. [2001] O.J. (Quicklaw) no. 3280 (S.C.J.).
68. Criminal Code, s. 265 (3) (c).
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ened to disclose them if she told. He was charged with making child por-
nography and sexual assault. He argued consent 69. Prior to Sharpe, the
Crown had the option to proceed solely on the child pornography charges
where they believed that to be in the best interests of the complainant. In
that case, the complainant might not even have to testify. This could be
especially important where the complainant has a mental disability or has
no family support. Now, the Crown will have to prove non-consent for both
charges.
These are the real implications of the majority's exceptions. They bear
little resemblance to the situations on which the examples are based. The
exceptions chosen by the majority represent the triumph of the hypotheti-
cal over the real. They privilege possibility and imagination over the reality
of child sexual abuse and pornography.
5 The question of the remedy
The failure of the majority to consider these implications of its excep-
tions calls into question the wisdom of the breadth of the reading down
required to create these exceptions. There are a number of remedial possi-
bilities that flow from a finding that the legislation was constitutional in
most of its applications, but unconstitutional as applied to a few situations.
One is to strike down the offending sections altogether, either immediately
or after a period of time during which invalidity is suspended 70. Under this
approach, although the perceived defect is in the definition of child por-
nography, it would be necessary to strike out the offences of possession
and making child pornography as well. It would make no sense just to strike
out the definition, leaving the section otherwise intact but with its main
term undefined. It would then be open to Parliament to re-enact the sec-
tions with a different, more restrictive definition or to invoke the notwith-
standing clause in s. 33 of the Charter to uphold the legislation in its current
form notwithstanding the s. 2 (b) Charter violation. This was the option
chosen by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, who limited its remedy to
the offence of possession only, and is obviously a choice likely to provoke
the greatest public and political reaction.
Another possibility suggested by some commentators was to grant
constitutional exemptions to individual accused on a case-by-case basis
69. The details of this case were recounted to me by a Crown attorney in Ontario. The case
is pending.
70. A.W. MCKAY, 10c. cit., note 22, at 301 ; H. STEWART, < A Judicious Response to Over-
breadth: R. v. Sharpe >>, (2000) 43 Crim. LQ. 159, 178-179 (supporting remedy of Court
of Appeal).
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where the facts of the case would result in an unconstitutional application
of the law 71 . This approach has the virtue of resting on reality rather than
hypothetical cases, but it cannot address the « chilling effect >> relied on by
opponents of the law. If one is prepared to recognize this effect, the fact
that a constitutional exemption can only be sought after a charge, trial, and
conviction must be seen as a deterrent to legitimate expression that will
simply suppress altogether, rather than permit, the expression in question.
The final remedial option was the one chosen by the Court, which can
be described either as reading down the provision to comply with the Char-
ter, or reading in the exceptions necessary to make the section constitu-
tional. However, this remedy does not take the form of merely adding in a
group unfairly excluded from the benefit of the law, as was done in the two
cases on which the majority relies. In Schachter v. Canada,72 the first de-
cision that used reading in as a remedy, the Court added the word << adop-
tive parent >> to a statute providing parental benefits. In so doing, there was
little difficulty in foreseeing the practical consequences of this addition.
Adoptive parents could now collect a benefit previously available only to
natural parents. The one significant consequence was the fact that this ad-
dition would require additional expenditure on the part of the government,
potentially affecting other fiscal choices. Similarly, in Vriend v. Alberta,
the Court added the words « sexual orientation >> to the grounds of discrimi-
nation recognized in Alberta's human rights legislation73. Once again, while
the decision attracted criticism for interfering with legislative decision-
making, it could not be said that the consequences of the addition were
unforeseen or complex. In fact, most other provinces had already included
this ground of discrimination for some time.
The use of reading in as a remedy in these circumstances made sense
for a number of reasons. It did not involve an exercise in legislative draft-
ing; only a couple of words were needed to extend the benefit of the legis-
lation to additional persons. The outcome of the change was predictable
and straightforward. Most importantly, the reading in was done in the con-
text of infringements of the equality rights guaranteed by s. 15 of the Char-
ter. A meaningful commitment to substantive equality requires that the
Court not limit itself to preventing the state from taking away rights and
benefits from members of disadvantaged groups, since such a guarantee
71. R. FRATER, < The Sharpe Edge of the Corbiere Wedge: Are 'Reasonable Hypotheticals'
Still Reasonable ? ,, (1999) 25 C.R.(4th) 307,310-311 ; J. Ross, « R. v. Sharpe and Private
Possession of Child Pornography >, (2000) 11 Constitutional Forum 50, 58.
72. [19921 2 S.CR. 679.
73. [19981 1 S.C.R. 493.
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means little to groups whose disadvantage is such that they have never
enjoyed those rights and benefits in the first place. Instead, as s. 15 (2) of
the Charter recognizes, the achievement of equality sometimes requires
positive action on the part of government. A failure to live up to this stan-
dard cannot be solved simply by taking away the benefit from everyone
else. It can fairly be said that the reading in done in those cases met the
twin guiding principles identified in Schachter: respect for the role of Par-
liament and respect for the purpose of the Charter.
The detailed exceptions that the Court reads in to the child pornogra-
phy provisions in Sharpe share none of these features. In effect, the Court
has added two new subsections to the definition of < child pornography >>,
with some associated reasons as to how they might be interpreted and ap-
plied. This degree of intervention through reading in is unprecedented.
There is no question of extending a legislative benefit to anyone as in the s.
15 context and the real implications of the subsections were clearly not well
understood. The length and complexity of the legislative process gives in-
terested parties time to lobby for changes to proposed statutory language
and to explore as part of the law-making process the potential implications
of new legislation. If the legislature had proposed the two exceptions set
out in Sharpe, this is exactly what could have happened. This might have
resulted in the wording being changed or abandoned altogether.
Conclusion
If, even after giving the definition of child pornography in the Crimi-
nal Code such a restrictive definition, and interpreting the exceptions and
defences so broadly, the Court was still left with the conviction that the
provision was an overbroad infringement on expression based on its two
examples, then it should have struck down the law. If the majority of the
Court was hesitant to take this step, they might then have examined the
source of this hesitation by looking more closely at the reality of their ex-
ceptions. Since Sharpe, a trial judge in Winnipeg has held that a number of
photos of pre-teen girls, distributed on the internet, are not child pornogra-
phy because they do not meet the dominant sexual purpose definition as
explained in Sharpe. One of the photos presents a girl, probably 12 or 13,
lying naked on her stomach, wearing thigh length stockings and a string of
beads around her waist. The accused in that case acknowledged that he
masturbated to the photos74. Who are the girls in these photos and why are
74. L. REYNOLDS, << High Court Ruling Frustrates Police >, Winnipeg Free Press, July 24,
2001, A6. The man in question, Lloyd Taylor, was convicted of one count of distributing
child pornography in relation to another photo.
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they being distributed as Internet pornography ? Would they consider that
they are being used for a sexual purpose ? Why aren't they the reasonable
observers here ?
As for John Sharpe, he filed a complaint with the Law Society of Brit-
ish Columbia against his lawyer for mishandling his appeal. Sharpe told
reporters that his lawyer should have argued that child pornography is not
harmful at all. He told reporters that with the Internet, child pornography
has «<never been cheaper, easier, less risky to obtain. If you believe the
Crown's theory, there should have been a dramatic increase in child sexual
assault. That has not happened. >75 Sharpe of course continues to deny that
the child pornography is itself evidence of sexual abuse. He is disappointed
with the reach of the exceptions, since « any serious writer writes for an
audience. >76 This is the reality of children in pornography after Sharpe.
Canadian criminal law prohibits the distribution of holocaust denial
pamphlets and similar publications as hate propaganda 77.These documents
tell a lie about an identifiable group in order to encourage others to dis-
criminate against members of that group. If someone were to make hate
literature about children, what would it look like ? What kind of lie could
you tell about children that might make people want to harm them ? Child
pornography is a kind of hate propaganda against children. It lies about
children's sexuality to further justify their already widespread abuse by
adults. It lies to children, who are shown the material as a way of normal-
izing the sexual abuse inflicted on them, and it lies to users of child pornog-
raphy, by telling them that children enjoy being sexual for the gratification
of adult men. And child pornography does this through the sexual abuse of
children, preserving, sharing and re-enacting that abuse. Equality for chil-
dren, not to mention adult women abused in pornography, will never be
achieved by denying these acts of discrimination in favour of an analysis
situated in the abstract realm of expression.
75. M. HUME,<< Pornographer Says He was Betrayed: Believes Lawyer Didn't Defend Him
Wholeheartedly , The National Post, February 21, 2001, A 1.
76. Ibid.
77. Criminal Code, ss. 318, 319.
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